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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The use of practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in diverse areas of knowledge increases every day. 
This growth warning about the increased probability of accidents, radiological and nuclear emergencies, with 
possible consequences for the public, workers and the environment. Within this scenario, it is clear that studies 
and reassessments of the emergency response actions, receive proposals for continuous improvement. The 
achievement of the objectives of the response must be sustained by tactical, operational and logistics optimized 
processes. The articulation through communication between the teams involved in the response must be 
adaptable to each accident or emergency, respecting its size. The objective of this study is to perform an 
assessment on the management of communication in the actions of Preparedness and Response to Nuclear and 
Radiological Emergencies. This assessment is supported by best practices of the Incident Command System 
(ICS) and the Institute of Project Management (Project Management Institute - PMI). For this purpose, based on 
models referred were established performance indicators supported by the BSC (Balanced Scorecard). These 
indicators allowed to evaluate more objectively the performance of the communication processes associated 
with each phase of the response. The study resulted in the proposed model documents aiming to assist planning 
of communications exercises in preparation and response actions, supported and adapted the best practices of 
PMI. These methodologies were evaluated by real cases selected from radiological and nuclear emergencies 
published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to the extension of the use of ionizing radiation in the radiological and nuclear areas in 
Brazil and around the world, one cannot neglecting to consider that this scenario leads to 
increased probability of accidents with possible consequences for the public, workers and the 
environment. 
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In the context of the nuclear and radiological area, an accident occurs when any event, 
including operating errors or equipment failures, consequences, actual or potential are 
relevant from the point of view of radiation protection (1). Are considered possible scenarios 
for accidents involving radioactive sources: loss, theft, damage or fire from a radioactive 
source, re-entry of satellites containing radioactive sources in the atmosphere; accident in 
transporting radioactive sources; overexposure in the medical area, contamination of food 
fountains and water (2). 
 
Currently, also exists a major concern with criminal or terrorist acts using radioactive 
materials as these may cause panic and important psychological impacts, economic and social 
disruption (1,3). Given these events, radiological or nuclear emergencies, especially in 
terrorism will continue to be serious and continuing threat. 
 
In the scenarios mentioned above, an accident can lead to an emergency. The response to a 
nuclear or radiological emergency is a set of actions intended to mitigate the consequences of 
the accident to restore security and human health, quality of life, property and the 
environment. The answer is performed by people, stakeholders, who use communication to 
be informed about facts, understand how to perform tasks and fulfill the objectives outlined 
in the plan (4,5). Therefore one must first understand before implementing what are the 
expectations of stakeholders. This process shall include the information and communications 
needs of the parties, for example, who needs what information, when they need it, how it will 
be provided, by whom, and what are the means (5). 
 
So communication through the exchange and sharing of resources, promotes mutual 
understanding, the proper dissemination of information, the key elements in managing any 
emergency response (3, 5, 6,7). Therefore, communication must be clear. There must be no 
elements that may interfere with or distort the process of communicating information, 
affecting or impairing the correct understanding between sender and receiver. These elements 
are called barriers to communication, which can be knowledge, behavioral, organizational or 
technical (8). 
 
In a response are identified some of the possible barriers to communication between members 
of the emergency team (8,2): (a) belonging to different institutions, with their own technical 
and organizational aspects, (b) different cultures, (c) specific language depending of the area; 
(d) Behavioural aspects distinct, (e) belong to different geographic regions, (f) power 
relations at different levels. In scenarios radiological emergencies of great magnitude is more 
evident this aspect, given the nature interdisciplinary and interinstitutional required by this 
type of response. 
 
It is clear that studies and revaluations of communication planning for emergency response 
actions receive proposals for continuous improvement. The objective of this article is to 
present a methodology for evaluating the communication management actions in 
preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological emergencies. This assessment is 
supported by best practices of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Project 
Management Institute (PMI), as these methodologies have in their structure chapters specific 
to communication management. Were evaluated in this article real cases selected nuclear and 
radiological emergencies published mainly by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), and indicators created by the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). This article presents a brief 
literature review, the methodology used, as well as discussion of the results. 
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
2.1. Project Management under PMI perspective  
 
A project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to achieve a specified objective. The projects 
are performed by people, usually have limited resources and are planned, executed and 
controlled (8,9). These characteristics have synergies to nuclear and radiological emergencies 
responses, because both are temporary, involve teams, are planned, executed and controlled 
(10, 11,12). 
 
From the perspective of the PMI, project management is the application of knowledge, skills, 
tools and techniques to project activities in order to meet their requirements. The project 
manager is the person responsible for conducting the project objectives (13). 
 
The projects are divided into process groups, Figure 1. The combination of these stages is 
known as the life cycle of the project. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between process groups, the level of activity required by 
the stakeholders and the life cycle of the project (14) 
 
 
Generally a project is divided into five process groups (12): 
 
(a) Initiation: Defines and authorizes the project or a project phase. 
(b) Planning: Defines, refines the goals and action plans necessary to achieve the project 
scope. 
(c) Implementation: Integrates people and other resources to accomplish the project. 
(d) Monitoring and control: Measures and monitors progress regularly to identify changes 
in relation to the project management plan and taking corrective actions. 
(e) Closure: formalizes acceptance of the product, service or result and leads the project or a 
project phase to an orderly end. 
 
The PMI organizes the project into nine knowledge areas, namely (14, 15, 16): Integration, 
Scope, Time, Cost, Quality, Human Resources, Communications, Risk and Procurement. 
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Each knowledge area is made up of specific processes. As the focus of this dissertation is to 
study communications management, will be presented in the next section the fundamentals 
inherent in this area of knowledge from the perspective of PMI (17). 
 
2.1.1. Communications management in projects 
 
Figure 2 shows the main processes related to communication management. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Representation summarized of 
Communications management in projects (8) 
 
 
The main objectives of the process 1 are: identify in advance the stakeholders communication 
needs, as well as methods of communication and the most appropriate way of the distributing 
information. Such requirements must be documented in a Communications Management 
Plan. This plan shall contain the information required in the "how to" information 
distribution, performance reporting and stakeholder management (17, 18). 
 
All planning is put into practice in the execution of the project and should be disseminated to 
stakeholders in the process 2. The third process  aims to keep stakeholders updated on project 
performance, as fulfillment of deadlines, updating risks, estimates (17,18). As for the process 
4, projects involve a wide range of stakeholders, whose interests and demands need to be 
considered in making management decisions to mitigate possible failures that may impact the 
success of the project (19). In this sense, the communication requirements of the stakeholders 
should be identified, assessed and resolved. 
 
According to PMI 57% of failures in projects is given by miscommunication between 
stakeholders, 72% of organizations indicate the communication management as one of the 
main problems in projects. Still, communication is the fourth item less considered in project 
management (20). 
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2.2  Incident Command System - ICS 
 
The SCI was developed in the 70s in response to a series of forest fires that almost destroyed 
the southwest of California. At that time, the authorities of municipalities, counties and state 
government itself helped to form the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for 
Potential Emergencies (FireScope) (21). 
 
In the nuclear area, the IAEA adopted ICS as a reference model for the formation of the new 
version of TECDOC-953 (22). The construction of this document took into account the 
lessons learned from the nuclear and radiological accidents occurred. This is the method 
adopted by the IAEA for the training and preparation professionals of emergency, more 
specifically the first responders in the area radiological or nuclear (16). 
 
The ICS is a highly formalized, characterized by extensive rules, procedures and instructions. 
The work within the system is specialized, based on standardized routines and require skilled 
professionals (23, 24). The jobs are arranged hierarchically and each team member reports 
and receives work assignments only a designated person (25). The objectives of the response, 
as well as the plans are set at the top of the hierarchy or the functions near the top (22). In 
Figure 3 is shown an example of an organizational structure of ICS (26). 
 
The commander of the emergency / incident is the person who holds the position of highest 
hierarchy of the ICS. This functional position should always be busy (29). The person 
occupying this position is responsible for coordinating the activities at the emergency site, the 
development and implementation of strategic decisions and the ordering and release of 
resources (31). The commander may delegate emergency activities subordinate to the four 
sections, and they shall report directly to the commander (33). 
 
The operations section is responsible for the development and execution of all tactical 
operations directly related to the primary objectives of the ICS (21, 22). 
 
The logistics section provides facilities and support services staff response (26). This section 
is responsible for medical support, food, supplies, facilities and field support personnel for 
emergency care (21). Like other sections, this section has sub-sections called units. The units 
are elements of the structural organization of the ICS who have a functional responsibility for 
a specific incident to sections of planning, logistics and finance (22). One of the units 
involved in the logistics section is the unit of communication. 
 
In the planning section, the action plan is developed to achieve the objectives of the 
emergency response. Therefore, in this section are collected, evaluated and disseminated 
informations about developing of the incident. Also available are information resources for 
response (21, 24, 26). ICS calls this plan the Incident Action Plan (IAP) (21). 
 
Already section Finance and Administration performs accounting, procurement and cost 
analysis of the response (21, 27). 
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Figure 3. The Organizational Structure of ICS 
(24, 25) 
 
 
Finally, the liaison officers are the professionals responsible for assisting the commander to 
coordinate response actions that occur at the crash site with other institutions (23). Security 
officers are the professionals responsible for maintaining safe conditions for workers at the 
scene of the accident (26). Already the official public communication are responsible for 
determining the processes, procedures and systems for communicating timely and accurate 
information to the public during a crisis or emergency (23, 25). 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Analysis Units 
 
In the selection of units of analysis, this article entitled case, for application of the method we 
selected four accidents, whose characteristics and references are presented in Table 1. 
 
The choice of the reported accidents took into account several factors: cut the timeline in 
order to allow a retrospective view (28, 29), the type of accident (radiological or nuclear) 
and; accidents that have been widely cited in references, in order to assist a better argument 
results. 
 
 
Table 1. Publications that were taken as references to documentary Assessment 
Management Communication. 
 
Accident  Year Emergency type  Documentary evidence  
Three Mile Island 1979 Nuclear 30,31, 32 
Chernobyl 1986 Nuclear 33, 34, 35 
Goiânia 1987 Radiológica 36, 37 
Nueva Aldea 2005 Radiológica 38 
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3.2 Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis was to examine the references listed in Table 1, seeking information related 
to the processes of Communication Management for each case. All indicators developed are 
found in (17). 
 
3.3 Method of Evaluation 
 
The proposed method to support critical evaluation Communications Management Actions in 
Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies was based on BSC (Balanced Scorecard). 
BSC stands out as a tool to implement a system of performance measurement that starts with 
strategic planning and defining indicators that can be organized in a hierarchical manner, 
linking the operational and tactical levels to strategic (38,39). 
 
The BSC has been used in the evaluation of emergency management in the disaster area, as 
well as plans for crisis communications in support of emergency management. There is a 
growing interest of public organizations in evaluating their emergency response plans, 
especially in regard to communication. This is due to the threats and failures observed 
through lessons learned (40, 41, 42). 
 
3.4 Performance Indicators 
 
The development of performance indicators, called KPIs (Key Performance Indicators), were 
taken into account shall: (1) be established before the response, (2) serve to measure 
acceptance of communication processes in the response, (3) indicate if the communication 
management response has the expected performance. 
 
The indicators developed were characterized by a connection between the processes of 
managing communication established by PMI and the organizational structure adopted by 
ICS applied to the management of the response. It was considered that a response can be 
compared to a project. The answer as well as a project has a life cycle, related time domain 
process-specific communication management discussed in PMI and ICS, as can be seen in 
Figure 4. 
 
In addition, sought to link the steps in the time domain with the phases of a response. 
According to (15) the management of an Emergency Response Radiological or Nuclear 
resembles the response to emergencies involving hazardous materials. Thus, it can be 
considered that mitigation is the reduction or limitation of the risks and impacts of disasters 
related (43,44). The preparation is to ensure that mechanisms have been previously 
established for the response to a radiological emergency or nuclear is immediate, effective 
and coordinated at both the local and national levels (10,22). The answer is the provision of 
emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster to save lives, 
reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of those 
affected (10, 22, 44). Finally, the phase of recovery is the restoration and improvement of 
appropriate facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of the communities affected by the 
disaster, including efforts to reduce the risk from disasters (10,44). 
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Figure 4. The integration between the processes of Communication Management by 
PMI, ICS and phases of the Management Response to Nuclear and Radiological 
Emergency (17) 
 
 
3.5 Proposed Criteria used to evaluate the indicators 
 
In this stage it was proposed criteria for evaluation of indicators in a qualitative way, and 
developed an evaluation scale in color, being graded, (17), in order to provide a more rapid 
and the results of the comprehensive communication management. Each indicator is coded 
notes, Table 2, and colors, Table 3, on scales categorized. To determine the classification of 
categories was used Likert scale, employing five categories, ordered and equally spaced. 
 
 
Table 2. Grading scale for the Evaluation of Performance Indicators 
 
Grade Criteria 
0 There is no evidence that the task was accomplished. 
1 There is no evidence that the task was accomplished, but there is evidence that stakeholders (members of the response) recognize the need for achievement. 
2 There is evidence that the task has been partially performed, but without considering an established method within the communications planning. 
3 There is evidence that the task has been partially performed, considering an established method within the communications planning. 
4 There is evidence that the task was accomplished, considering an established method in the communication planning 
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The response divided into phases, was then verified the relationship between the processes 
identified and the areas of the BSC, or better as they are aligned with the strategic objectives 
of the response. Thus, each case was classified as: Targeted Beneficiaries (TB) Internal 
Process (IP) and Learning and Growth (LG). The indicators associated with TB aim to 
qualify how much was answered the expectations of all stakeholders. The indicators linked to 
IP intended to identify the appropriate use of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques. Finally, 
the indicators associated with LG, are related to the learning derived from lessons learned. 
 
Associated to the note (score) it was calculated relative deviation of this in relation to the 
maximum agreed (note 4). It is hoped that the results allow a qualitative assessment of how 
much in percentage terms the indicators developed for the management of communications 
response deviate from the agreed maximum. Each indicator developed  by the author has been 
classified as the application of the model ICS or PMI. Each process was divided into tasks 
(activities), to better discriminate the items to be checked. For each case, the set of indicators 
developed was evaluated by grades (scores) as classified according to Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Color scale associated with the notes in the Evaluation Indicators 
 
Average grade of 
the indicators  
Color Description 
< 2 
Red There are serious deficiencies in communication 
management response and corrective actions to be 
implemented. 
≥ 2 - <3 
Yellow The performance of the communications management 
partially meets good practice and stakeholder expectations, 
improvements need to be implemented. 
≥ 3- ≤4 Green The performance of the communications management best practices and meets stakeholder expectations 
 
 
The final evaluation and management phases of communication in response was by averaging 
the grades (scores) of the indicators developed. 
 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
This study developed 60 indicators to evaluate the communication management, distributed 
23 indicators for the mitigation phase (initiation), 28 indicators for the preparation phase 
(planning), 5 indicators for the response phase (execution) and 4 indicators for the recovery 
phase (closure). These indicators are associated with a set of indicators as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Summary Table of Group Indicators for each phase of the response. 
 
Phases of the 
Response  Key Performance Indicators (KPI) Model 
BSC  
Area  
Mitigation 
(Initiation) 
Management of Emergency Operations ICS  IP  
Identification, Notification and Activation ICS TB  
Mitigation Actions ICS IP 
Conduct opening meeting of Response PMI  IP 
Identification of Stakeholders PMI  TB 
Stakeholder Management PMI  TB 
Preparing 
(Planning)  
Communications Planning PMI  IP 
Plan Communication with Public ICS TB 
Communications Management Plan PMI  IP 
Response 
(Execution) Distribute Information PMI  IP 
Recovery 
(Closing) Lessons Learned PMI/ ICS LG  
 
 
The following are the results of the evaluation of the Communication Management for each 
phase of the response. 
 
4.1 Assessment of Management Communication Phases of Response 
 
The initiation phase (mitigation) is the strategic moment of the response. It is known that 
adverse dangers of sources, often cannot be completely prevented, but their scale or severity 
can be substantially lessened by various strategies and actions. As can be seen in Figure 5 (a), 
it is estimated that approximately 25%, 28%, 42% and 70% of the activities related to the 
management of the communication were identified as held for cases TMI, Chernobyl, 
Goiânia and Nueva Aldea respectively for the Inception phase. Many indicators of this stage 
are related to ICS. This phase undergoes a national response structure well defined and 
trained, with good coordination between public agencies, non-governmental agencies and 
local response plans that documents are "alive", ie, exercised and under constant 
reassessment. These are the starting points for a good Communication Management. 
 
Mitigation phase were not identified documentary evidence of the existence of an Emergency 
Response Plan for Nuclear Regional or National for TMI and Chernobyl. For both cases, 
there was an appropriate setting in the matrix of responsibilities, lack of communication 
between the authorities and other responsible agencies. This justifies the low notes (scores) 
for Indicator Management of Emergency Operations. Goiânia presented better results than the 
cases TMI and Chernobyl, at this stage, due to a structure adapted to deal with emergencies 
Radiological and Nuclear. In addition, the emergency coordinator used the lessons learned 
from the radiological accident occurred in Ciudad Juarez in Mexico, occurred in 1983. 
 
Still in the Mitigation, TMI and Chernobyl showed serious deficiencies as the indicator 
Identification, Notification and Activation. This indicator is strongly correlated with the 
ability of the command to take the first steps for mitigation, and provide instructions 
stakeholders as a team and supporting organizations, States and the IAEA. 
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The case Goiânia had a better performance than TMI and Chernobyl, for indicator Mitigation 
Actions, as was identified in the Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry (IRD) had a 
control room for emergency equipped with a communications network. 
 
No evidence was found of designating responsible for managing inter-team communication, 
for any of the cases analyzed. Only if the Nueva Aldea no evidence of the meeting's opening 
response. The identification of stakeholders to TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia could have been 
better conducted. Nueva Aldea had a definite structure to deal with emergencies Radiological 
and Nuclear, this can justify better results when compared to other cases. 
 
In the Planning phase (preparing), Figure 5 (b) it appears that the estimates are similar to 
those found in the Mitigation phase. All cases showed the need for improvements in the 
communication planning specifically TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia. 
 
 
 
 
(a) Mitigation (Initiation)    (b) Preparing (Planning) 
 
Figure 5: Estimated Percentage of activities identified as realized and unrealized in the 
analyzed publications - Phases: Mitigation and Planning 
 
 
It was not possible to identify Substantial evidence that there was a planning communication 
employing a specific methodology for the development of messages for all cases. However, 
using the indicators developed, we found that the case Nueva Aldea, showed satisfactory 
results for the same indicator. The command named a single spokesperson to communicate 
with the media, in addition to drafting messages, instructions, information and warnings to 
individuals of the public. Regarding the indicator Planning Communication with the Public 
cases TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia had critical deficiencies. This indicator is quoted as an 
improvement on the lessons learned from publications. Where TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia 
is no clear evidence was formally defined a press or single spokesperson to communicate 
with the media. Regarding the indicator Communication Management Plan, there is strong 
evidence that there was a plan for TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia. As for the case Nueva Aldea, 
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presented evidence that some tasks in this plan were not fully carried out, indicating the need 
for improvement. 
 
Analyzing Figure 6 (a), phase response, it is estimated that approximately 30%, 20%, 45% 
and 55% of the activities related to the management of the communication were identified as 
made on the basis of reports analyzed for cases TMI, Chernobyl, Goiânia and Nueva Aldea, 
respectively. 
 
In TMI case there is strong evidence that central command did not received on time 
performance reports for the answer. What corroborates this finding was for the ordination of 
planning the evacuation of 650,000 people in around the plant, based on fragmentary 
information and partially wrong. Chernobyl had a worse index, since there were a lot of 
evidence of conducting activities related to Information Distribution indicator. 
 
In case of the emergency coordinator Goiânia set the frequency that should be presented on 
the progress of the response. Nueva Aldea if there were no evidence that all activities related 
to the Information Distribution indicator were completed successfully. 
 
Analyzing Figure 6 (b), to the stage of recovery (Closure) is an estimate that approximately 
50%, 50%, 50% and 75% of the activities related to the management of the communication 
were identified as made on the basis of reports analyzed for all cases. 
 
In the case TMI, it was found that shortly after the incident there were strong evidence of 
initiatives of the American authorities to generate learning and growth with this accident. The 
Chernobyl case, through the internet channel called "Chernobyl in Focus" IAEA, one can find 
a number of documents related to the accident, as well as its consequences. 
 
 
 
 
(a) Response (Execution)      (b) Recovery (Closing) 
 
Figure 6. Estimated percentage of activities identified as realized and unrealized in 
the analyzed publications - Phases: Response (Execution) and Recovery (Closing) 
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In the case Goiânia, it was identified that the lessons learned after the accident were 
generated by a report conducted by specialists of the National Commission of Nuclear 
Energy (CNEN) who participated in the response and personal meetings with members of the 
IAEA. The case Goiânia, originated the first publication as a formal and systematic 
description of a radiological accident. 
 
The case Nueva Aldea, showed better results than TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia. It should be 
noted that this case was the participation of experts from IAEA. There was participation from 
IAEA experts, consisting of a multidisciplinary team to assist those responsible for the 
closure of the response in the preparation of a final report. This also denotes a maturing by 
the IAEA to conduct, preparation and publication of lessons learned. 
 
4.2 Overall Management Communication for Analysis Units 
 
In Figure 7 there is the communication management of all responses, requiring the study and 
implementation of corrective measures. Overall the item in case Nueva Aldea no serious 
deficiencies regarding the management of the communication, since the estimate of the 
activities identified as made on the basis of publications, was approximately 66%. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of Reviews of Communication Management for the actions of the 
Emergency Response Radiological and Nuclear cases selected (17) 
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Cases of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl showed serious deficiencies in the management of 
communication for all indicators. Goiania now also made generally critical deficiencies, but 
in some indicators show activities by publications such as partially carried out. 
 
Analyzing the amount of planned tasks inherent in Communication Management proposed 
for assessment of cases, it is noticed that there was an improvement over time. 
 
Communication specialists and psychologists suggest that many of the sources of conflict, 
problems and misconceptions observed in response to the Chernobyl accident appeared 
because of lack of information. There was lack of communication from the former Soviet 
Union with neighboring countries, such as Italy and Denmark, the dissemination of 
information of potential risks inherent in radiation exposure (45). 
 
Although the Three Mile Island case was not considered an accident as serious as Chernobyl, 
this happened about 7 years ago. Also was a nuclear accident that had critical deficiencies 
communication. In (46) we can verify that communication was one of the most serious 
failures observed during the response at TMI. Given the above, TMI has brought many 
lessons learned in the communication referred. However, it is observed that the notes of the 
indicators approach in much the Chernobyl, denoting that the lessons learned have not been 
fully addressed and properly absorbed. 
 
The case Goiânia shown improvement in some indicators, highlighting the mitigation phase, 
compared to cases TMI and Chernobyl. However, it was found in (36), which after 8 and 1 
year, respectively, the TMI and Chernobyl accident indicator Planning Communication with 
the Public continued to have severe disabilities. In contrast, it appears that in Nueva Aldea 
the same indicator evolved past nearly two decades, indicating that the lessons learned may 
have been better applied to this indicator. 
 
Should be considered that Chernobyl and Goiânia were accidents involving many 
stakeholders and had a strong social and economic impact for their respective countries, with 
strong influence from the public and media. The Goiânia accident is rated at Level 5, of the 
INES scale. Accidents at TMI and Nueva Aldea had a coverage within the limits of its 
facilities, which has not occurred in Chernobyl and Goiânia. However, TMI took a much 
higher, partly due to lack of stakeholder management, highlighting the unmet expectations of 
the public and the media. 
 
Were not identified clear evidence in (30), (34), (33), the existence of a Plan of Managements 
of Communications at the time of occurrence of accidents at TMI, Chernobyl and Goiânia, 
respectively. This may explain the low notes in the preparing stage (planning), specifically 
the Communication Management. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The methodology allowed us to conclude that the communications management response 
actions could have been better if performed previously established and followed management 
models optimized for scenarios of accidents analyzed. 
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The PMI methodology associated with ICS proved complementary in the evaluation of 
management's communication response to radiological or nuclear emergencies. This allowed 
a good connection between the organizational requirements affects the ICS with the planning 
of communication contained in PMI, for all phases of the response. 
 
However, it should be noted that this assessment of Management Communication is limited 
to selected publications referenced accidents, being of vital importance to the improvement of 
the evaluation methodology proposed its application to practical exercises. Passed decades 
since the occurrence of the accidents studied, emergency actions need continuous formal 
treatment of Communications Planning, following an explicit methodology. 
 
As suggestions for future work envisioned the need for a deepening of the issues and 
improvement of indicators, as well as the criteria used for the scores (notes). This 
improvement can be achieved through the application of the proposed methodology in 
preparation exercises to nuclear and radiological emergencies. As well as conducting a 
similar study, which includes the recent Fukushima accident, can give a contribution to the 
constant process of growth and learning within the Communication Management applied to 
Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies. 
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